By: Micaela L. Neal

As Father’s Day swiftly approaches, a proposed class action settlement filed in Ohio federal court serves as a strong reminder that dads are every bit the parents that moms are.  While this may seem obvious as a general matter, the settlement is a reminder to employers that this parental equality needs to be reflected in parental leave policies, as well, and that such policies must be enforced with equality in mind.

The proposed class action settlement reflects that JPMorgan Chase (“Chase”) agreed to pay $5 million to hundreds of male employees who claimed they were not provided with the same parental leave opportunity as female employees when they became parents.  This is the largest settlement recorded in the United States for a parental leave discrimination case.

Chase’s parental leave policy provides for 16 weeks of paid parental leave to employees who are the “primary caregiver” of a new child. The class representative alleged that when he asked to take this paid parental leave after the birth of his son, however, the human resources department told him that females were presumed to be the primary caregivers and were eligible for 16 weeks of paid parental leave.  Males, on the other hand, were only eligible for two (2) paid weeks of leave, unless the mother of the child was incapacitated or back at work.  The lawsuit alleged that this policy in practice relied on and enforced sex-based stereotypes about who should be raising children, and constituted sex/gender discrimination.

The takeaway here is that all employment policies need to be gender-neutral, both in writing and in practice, even when the policy goes above and beyond what is actually required by law.  In Chase’s case, the law did not require paid parental leave, but rather Chase offered it as an employee benefit.  Because the benefit was not applied neutrally, this constituted gender discrimination.

In California, the law requires employers with at least 20 employees to provide parental leave for new parents who meet certain eligibility requirements, but the leave does not have to be paid. Employers should review their parental leave policies to assure equality and legal compliance.

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Micaela L. Neal is an attorney with Wanger Jones Helsley PC and practices in Fresno and Sacramento.  She regularly represents employers in wage and hour and other employment matters.  This article is intended to notify our clients and friends of changes and updates to the law and provide general information.  It is not intended, nor should it be used, as legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship between the author and the reader.

By: Micaela L. Neal

Private employers with 100 or more employees (as well as federal contractors and some subcontractors with 50 or more employees) are required to file an EEO-1 survey each year with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  The survey is to be submitted through the EEOC online portal.  This year, there are two deadlines that employers must meet:

First, Component 1 data must be submitted by May 31, 2019.  Component 1 data is the race, ethnicity and sex data traditionally required by the EEO-1.

Second, Component 2 data must be submitted by September 30, 2019.  Employers will be required to submit Component 2 data for calendar years 2017 and 2018.  Component 2 data is a new requirement, and consists of wage/pay data for the Workforce Snapshot Period.  Employers must identify the number of employees by race, ethnicity and sex within each of ten EEO-1 job categories who fall within 12 defined pay bands, as well as the hours worked by those employees for the calendar year.

The May 31, 2019 and September 30, 2019 deadlines are subject to change, and have been in a state of fluctuation as a related federal court case is making its way through the appellate process.  The Component 2 survey is not yet available online, although the EEOC has announced it should be available by mid-July.  Employers should make efforts to prepare the data required for the reports, but also stay apprised of developments.

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Micaela L. Neal is an attorney with Wanger Jones Helsley PC and practices in Fresno and Sacramento.  She regularly represents employers in wage and hour and other employment matters.  This article is intended to notify our clients and friends of changes and updates to the law and provide general information.  It is not intended, nor should it be used, as legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship between the author and the reader.

By: Micaela L. Neal

Taniguchi v. Restoration Homes, LLC,No. A152827, 2019 WL 1923068 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019), as corrected (May 2, 2019).

Back in the era of the Great Depression, the California Legislature enacted Civil Code Section 2924c, which provides that when all or part of the principal secured by a mortgage or deed of trust becomes due as a result of the borrower’s default in making payments, the borrower may reinstate the loan and avoid foreclosure by paying the amount in default, along with certain fees and expenses.  The statute was intended to counteract the “acceleration clauses” often included by lenders in loan documents (which accelerate the loan and require full payment of the entire loan in the event of default), and served the public policy of saving equities in homes, given that such equities were often built over time through the borrower’s monthly payments.  A California Court of Appeal recently held that this policy is still as important as ever.

In the case at hand, the borrowers had defaulted on their mortgage payments years earlier, and as a result entered into a loan modification agreement with their lender which provided, among other things, that approximately $116,000 of indebtedness (due to accrued and unpaid interest and principal and fees and costs from that first default) would be deferred until maturity of the loan.  Four years passed, and the borrowers defaulted again.  The lender notified the borrowers that to cure the second default and reinstate the loan, they would not only have to pay the current amount in default, fees and expenses, but would also have to pay the previously deferred amount, plus fees and interest.

The Court determined that this requirement to pay the previously deferred amount (which had grown to approximately $120,000) for reinstatement was excessive, and a violation of Section 2924c.  In so holding, the Court noted that the protection provided by the statute cannot be waived, and the logical interpretation of the statute is that the “amount in default” is clearly the missed payments on the modified loan – not those payments plus all previously deferred payments. The Court noted that the previously deferred amount was not “due and owing,” as, had the borrowers made all of their monthly payments, the lender could not have claimed the deferred sum until the end of the loan.  To require payment of that amount would deprive the borrowers of any opportunity to cure the precipitating default and reinstate the modified loan.

The takeaway for lenders is that the sanctity of Section 2924c may not be disregarded or manipulated, and borrowers must be afforded the protections of the statute, notwithstanding prior transgressions.

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Micaela L. Neal is an attorney with Wanger Jones Helsley PC and practices in Fresno and Sacramento.  Her practice includes frequent lender representation, with an emphasis on disputes involving contracts, debt collection, creditor’s rights, bankruptcy, partnership dissolution, breach of fiduciary duty, and indemnity.  This article is intended to notify our clients and friends of changes and updates to the law and provide general information.  It is not intended, nor should it be used, as legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship between the author and the reader.